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1. PROLOGUE
This article is about the implications of an ambiguous statement
* A.B., Harvard; LL.B., Yale; Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University; Senior
Fellow, Yale Law Faculty, 1966-67. Chairman, Committee on Securities and Investment
Banking, State Bar of Texas (which drafted much of the legislation here discussed); Vice-
Chairman, Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, State Bar of Texas; Member,
Committee on Corporate Law Revision of the same Section. The views are my own and not
necessarily those of the organizations listed. I gratefully acknowledge the assistance of John
P. Blair and Ernest L. Sample of the Beaumont Bar, in making available to me their briefs
and documents in the Tumblewood case.
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on a side issue in an intermediate court's already discounted opinion.
Why bother? Because it threatens the most widely used exemptions
in the Texas Securities Act, just when they had become workable and
reasonably free from pitfalls.
The exemptions are those for small offerings: sales up to thirty-five
securityholders, employee options, and fifteen sales a year.' They have
been analyzed in some detail by an earlier article,2 which noted that
each of them is conditioned on the absence of "public solicitation or
advertisements," but found little to say about the quoted phrase
except that it obviously precludes mass media advertising and large-
'Texas Securities Act (hereinafter cited simply "Section" or "§").
1. Provided such sale is made without any public solicitation or adver-
tisements, (a) the sale of any security by the issuer thereof so long as the total
number of security holders of the issuer thereof does not exceed thirty-five
(35) persons after taking such sale into account; (b) the sale of shares of
stock pursuant to the grant of an employees' restricted stock option as defined
in the Internal Revenue Laws of the United States; or (c) the sale by an
issuer of its securities during the period of twelve (12) months ending with
the date of the sale in question to not more than fifteen (15) persons (ex-
cluding, in determining such fifteen (15) persons, purchasers of securities in
transactions exempt under other provisions of this Section 5, purchasers of
securities exempt under Section 6 hereof and purchasers of securities which
are part of an offering registered under Section 7 hereof), provided such
persons purchased such securities for their own account and not for distribu-
tion.
The issuer shall file a notice not less than five (5) days prior to the date
of consummation of any sale claimed to be exempt under the provisions of
clause (c), of this Subsection I, setting forth the name and address of the
issuer, the total amount of the securities to be sold under this clause, the
price at which the securities are to be sold, the date on which the securities
are to be sold, the names and addresses of the proposed purchasers, and such
other information as the Commissioner may reasonably require, including a cer-
tificate of a principal officer of the issuer that reasonable information concern-
ing the plan of business and the financial condition of the issuer has been
furnished to the proposed purchasers. The Commissioner may by order revoke
or suspend the exemption under this clause (c) with respect to any security
if he has reasonable cause to believe that the plan of business of the issuer of
such security, the security, or the sale thereof would tend to work a fraud
or deceit upon the purchaser or purchasers thereof, such order to be subject
to review in the manner provided by Section 24 of this Act. The revocation or
suspension of this exemption shall be applicable to the issuer until such issuer
shall have received actual notice from the Commissioner of such revocation or
suspension.
Prior Version. At the time of the Tumblewood transaction, it read:
I. The sale by any corporation of its securities or by any unincorporated
association or partnership of interests, where the total membership or stock-
holders will not thereafter exceed thirty-five (35), and where the sale is
made without the use of advertisements or any form of public solicitation.
Employee Options. This article concentrates on the problems under the 35-man and
15-a-year exemptions. No particular attention is given to the employee option exemption,
although it generally presents the same difficulties in respect of advertisements.
Oil and Gas Interests. A parallel exemption for sales of oil and gas interests to thirty-five
or fewer purchasers similarly requires that "no use is made of advertisement or public solici-
tation," § 5.Q. This provision is not separately treated in the present article, but most of the
argument and analysis is applicable to it.
'Bromberg, Texas Exemptions for Small Offerings of Corporate Securities, 18 Sw. L. J.
537 (1964).
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scale mail or telephone solicitation.' This language, particularly the
"advertisements" part is ripe for further discussion because of the
Tumblewood decision.4 The case is the first to pass on the quoted
phrase in Texas and one of the few anywhere to construe advertise-
ments under the securities law.
The threat, in brief, is that compliance with the federal securities
laws and other parts of the Texas act, may violate the small offering
exemptions and subject the seller to civil liability, and perhaps
worse.5
2. THE Tumblewood CASE
Matise (the Plaintiff) was one of several persons instrumental in
forming the Tumblewood Bowling Corp. He performed a number
of services for it, including some in connection with the preliminary
planning and construction of its bowling alley, and others in selling
its stock. He was promised payment approximating ten per cent of
the total capitalization of the corporation and was voted $15,000
(close to the ten per cent) in cash and stock by the board of direc-
tors. When he was not paid, he sued, and was met with the defense
that he had no securities license and therefore could not recover
any commission for the sale of stock.' Claiming that the sale was
exempt under section 5.1 [now, with changes, 5.1 (a) I because the
number of stockholders did not exceed thirty-five,' and therefore that
no license was necessary, he had the burden' of proving the exemption
in all its elements, including the absence of "public solicitation or ad-
vertisements." He prevailed on special issues and on defendants' mo-
tion for judgment n.o.v. This was no small achievement since he con-
ceded that he talked to some 250 people about buying the stock.10
The number was too big (especially considering that some of them
'Id. at 552.
'Tumblewood Bowling Corp. v. Matise, 388 S.W.2d 479 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965)
error ref. n.r.e., noted 4 BULL. OF SFC. ON CORP., BANK & Bus. L., State Bar of Texas I
(No. 1, Oct. 1965).
0 For the consequences of violating an exemption see Bromberg, op. cit. supra note 2, at
556-57. Another consequence, of course, is what happened to Matise: loss of commission
for failure to have a dealer's license.
6 Section 12.
'Section 34.
" There were only twenty-seven or twenty-nine. Apparently no question arose whether
husband and wife owning as community property were to be counted as one or two; see
Bromberg, op. cit. supra note 2, at 542, 550.
Matise had the 35-man limit firmly in mind but was pathetically---or blatantly-
ignorant of the prohibition of public solicitation and advertisements; see his testimony at
388 S.W.2d at 482.
9 Section 27.
'o 388 S.W.2d at 482-83.
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were strangers) ", and the Beaumont Court of Civil Appeals pre-
dictably and correctly reversed and rendered on the ground there
had been public solicitation. It invoked, quite reasonably, federal
and other states' precedents on "public offering," effectively equat-
ing the phrase with "public solicitation," and concluded: "One who
talked to some 250 people about purchasing stock in a corporation,
some of whom he did not know beforehand, and testified that he
was going to talk to as many people as necessary to sell $150,000
worth of stock cannot be heard to say that he did not engage in
public solicitation in the sale of securities.""
If the court had stopped here, this article need not have been
written. 3
3. THE STATEMENT ON ADVERTISING
The decision also deals with brochures used by Matise to aid in
the stock sales. Unfortunately, it is not clear from the opinion what
the brochures said, how many different versions there were, or who
saw them. The court wrote:
In 1960 [Matise] . . .prepared brochures to sell the stock . . .stating
that his compensation was to be a commission of 10 per cent of total
stock sold. The brochures contained the usual data as to proposed capi-
tal stock, nature of project, estimated [future] income and amounted to
a detailed prospectus. In soliciting the sale of stock to some 2 50 persons,
appellee exhibited said brochures to such prospective purchasers of
stock. 4
Actually, it appears that there were three different brochures: two
prepared by pinsetter manufacturers (AMF & Brunswick) and one
prepared by Matise by reproducing parts of the other two as well
as additional material. I have not been able to lay hands on any of
these but can reconstruct them this far from briefs and partial
transcripts:
Matise brochure (Exhibit D-1) : cover sheet stating "Pete Matise,
" See Bromberg, op. cit. supra note 2, at 552. The court emphasized the lack of prior
contact both in the quotation at note 12 infra and in italics at 388 S.W.2d at 482. See
also Birchfield v. State, 401 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966) (letters to certain com-
panies listed in the Houston telephone book).
12388 S.W.2d at 483.
13This is not to say that the case was an easy one. There were perplexing issues, not
treated here, of pari delicto, acquiescence, estoppel and joint venture. There were also
questions about whether the sales or offers were made by means of the disputed advertise-
ments or solicitation, the number of people who saw the advertisements, and whether Matise
was to be compensated for selling securities or for general services to the corporation. Of
these, the only one dealt with at all directly by the civil appeals court is whether the sales
were made by use of the brochure; the court quoted the sweeping definition of sale in § 4.
E, which includes "an attempt to dispose of a security for value," and implied (correctly)
that the brochure was used in the sales, in this sense. 388 S.W.2d at 481.
14 388 S.W.2d at 482.
[Vol. 20:239
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Investments" and "Blanton-Matise Investment Company," with
addresses and phone numbers; second sheet with various information
pertaining to profitability and building plans for a bowling alley;
third-fourth sheets: picture of proposed bowling lane, and plot plan;
proposed set of bylaws copied from another bowling alley; AMF esti-
mate of a bowling alley's receipts, disbursements and net; finally,
a statement concerning Matise's ten per cent compensation for sell-
ing stock."5 There may have been three copies of this Brochure, al-
though this is not clear. At some stage in the selling, the Tumble-
wood attorney saw the Matise brochure and directed Matise to stop
using it.'" It is not clear how many people saw it.
Brunswick brochure or book: described only as complete and ex-
plaining more than the Matise brochure. It had nothing on Tumble-
wood specifically. There were either two or three of these,' but
Matise's testimony may have confused them with his own brochures.
They were apparently used in addition to the Matise brochures in
some instances."6
AMF brochure: a financial estimate from this was included in the
Matise brochure, but there is no indication what else it contained,
or whether it was used in any other way.
The brochure described by the court was obviously Matise's, al-
though the court should not be understood as saying that it was
"a detailed prospectus" in the sense required for a registered offering
by either Texas or federal law. It omitted much required informa-
tion and contained estimates of future income which are almost
invariably prohibited.' For an exempt offering, no specific form of
"5 Testimony of P. T. Matise, Cause No. A-76, 750-In re Tumblewood Bowling Corp.,
81-83. For the format, see text accompanying note 65 infra.
10id. at 105.
17Id. at 80, 87.
18 Id. at 101, 102, perhaps 87.
1 Texas. Section 9. C: ". . . by prospectus which fairly discloses the material facts about
the plan of finance and business." The prospectus is subject to approval by the Commis-
sioner who has promulgated a detailed "Suggested Outline to Assist in Preparing Prospec-
tus for Local Texas Offerings Only" (undated). It appears that the following major items,
which are practically all the applicable ones called for by the Current Outline, were
omitted from Matise's brochure, or incompletely stated: use of proceeds, capital structure.
plan of distribution, cost of equity shares held by organizers, organization and affiliates,
background and history of business, capital stock being registered, directors and executive
officers, remuneration of officers and directors, principal holders of equity securities, options
to purchase securities, interest of management and others in certain transactions, and legal
opinions. The current Outline, as well as the one probably in effect at the time of these
transactions (1960), would in all likelihood have precluded any earnings projection or pre-
diction. This has been the consistent administrative practice, so far as I am aware, and is
suggested by the portion of the "Outline" which prohibits "any subject matter which goes
further than a fair and factual presentation necessary to disclose the material facts" (page
3 of the current version).
Federal. For the contents of the typical prospectus, see SEC Form S-1, Items 1-21, 17
CFR § 239.11 (Supp. 1965), CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 557121, 7123. On the prohibition of
1966]
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information or prospectus is required or prohibited, unless it consti-
tutes an advertisement, or is untrue or misleading. No issue was
made that the Tumblewood brochures were untrue or misleading
in any way, although the seller naturally would not need or want to
go into this area.
Of the Matise brochure, the court wrote what we dub the state-
ment on advertising:
Clearly, the provisions of Section 22(A.) indicate that a pamphlet or
brochure used to aid in the sale of securities would be advertising within
the meaning of that term as used in The Securities Act. One who is en-
gaged in selling securities is not entitled to an exemption under Section
5 (.) of The Securities Act if he uses such a brochure to aid in the sale
of such securities as appellee used and admitted that he used to aid him
in selling stock."°
This disturbing language, which suggests that any brochure or
pamphlet (and thus perhaps any written material) would destroy
the small offering exemptions," is almost verbatim from the amicus
brief of the Attorney General. The first sentence is identical, but
the second varies from the Attorney General's: "One who is en-
gaged in selling securities is not entitled to an exemption under
Section 5 (I) of the Securities Act if he uses a brochure to aid in the
sale of such securities. [Matise] used a brochure as an aid in selling
stock. . . ."" This latter interpretation is even more disturbing,
coming as it does from the state's chief legal officer, filing as amicus
at the instance of the Securities Commissioner, because of the "state-
wide importance" of the case in interpreting advertising and public
solicitation."
The court's statement on advertising is clearly not a principal
holding. The public solicitation issue is treated first, occupies all but
a paragraph or two of the four-page opinion, and is the subject of
the main holding. It is tempting to dismiss the statement on advertis-
earnings predictions, see ISRAELS & DUFF, WHEN CORPORATION Go PUBLIC 106-10 (1962);
Heller, Disclosure Requirements Under Federal Securities Regulation, 16 Bus. LAW.
300, esp. 305-11 (1961), extracted JENNINGS & MARSH, CASES AND MATERIAL ON
SECURITIES REGULATION 97, 99-102 (1963).
20388 S.W.2d at 483.
" An astute commentator foresaw this problem years ago, Meer, The Texas Securities
Act-1957 Model: Facelift or Forward Look?, 36 TEXAS L. Ruv. 429, 445 (1958):
"Another possible question is whether a written memorandum circulated among prospective
participants to describe the proposition will be deemed an advertisement." He added, ibid.,
n.39: "Query whether it would make any difference if such memorandum were mimeo-
graphed or printed rather than typewritten ... Y'
'Brief for the Attorney General of Texas as Amicus Curiae, p. 14, Tumblewood
Bowling Corp. v. Matise, 388 S.W.2d 479 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965). Nothing in Tumble-
wood Bowling Corp.'s briefs is so sweeping. It was naturally content to assert that the
particular brochure, as particularly used, was an advertisement.
23 Id. at 2. For unexplained reasons, the Attorney General's participation is not recorded
in the Southwestern Reporter print of the case.
[Vol. 20:239
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ing as dictum, since it seems tossed in for good measure, with little
analysis or citation to support it. But there is specific reversal on the
point, which was an integral one, though secondary. So we classify
the statement as an alternative holding: a little more than dictum,
but not much.
4. POSSIBLE IMPACT OF THE STATEMENT
Assume that the statement means that any written material consti-
tutes an advertisement and is therefore prohibited in a small offering
exemption. How, then, can a seller comply with his obligation to
make full disclosure to the buyer? 4 He can, of course, present his
information orally, although this (if at all complex) is not as likely
to be absorbed and understood. Not only would oral presentation
tend to defeat the investor-informing purpose, but it would almost
certainly be less carefully and systematically presented. In addition,
there would be much greater room for later dispute about what
really was said.2" It would probably do more to encourage fraud than
to deter it. Admittedly, most securities are sold on oral representa-
tions, though (in the case of issues registered under federal or state
law) backed up by a comprehensive prospectus. It is hardly thinkable
that the legislature intended to prevent a seller from putting his rep-
resentations in writing, particularly in a new or small venture where
the risks of failure (and hence of unhappy investors) are likely to
be unusually high.20 A more welcome possibility is that there can be
written material which is not a brochure; see the discussion below. 7
The problem has become even more acute since the 1963 amend-
ment to section 5.1, which added the 15-a-year exemption. The latter
4 Section 33.A(2) creates civil liability (for rescission or damages) against any person
who "offers or sells a security (whether or not . . . exempt . . .) by means of any untrue
statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made not misleading . . ." This language was enacted in 1963 and
was not in force when the Tumblewood sales were made. Its predecessor impliedly created
civil liability for misrepresentation. TEXAS GEN. & SPEC. LAws 1957, ch. 269, § 33.
Quite apart from the Securities Act, sellers of securities have since 1919 been subject to
triple damages (though on a different, loss of the baragin, measure) for false representa-
tions or promises in the sale of securities. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4004 (1945).
Federal law often operates to require full disclosure in local securities transactions.
Even though they are exempt from federal registration, they are subject to the civil liabil-
ity provisions [similar to Texas § 33.A(2) above] whenever the mails or interstate
commerce are used. Securities Act of 1933, § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771 (2).
"5 The untrustworthiness of oral salesmanship of securities is one reason for the cus-
tomary disclaimer in prospectuses:
No dealer, salesman, or any other person, is authorized to give any infor-
mation or to make any representation not contained in this Prospectus. Any
information or representation not contained herein must not be relied on as
having been authorized by the company [issuer].
For many years, this has been part of the Texas Commissioner's suggested prospectus,
op. cit. supra n.19, at 2.
" See Bromberg, op. cit. supra note 2, at 564, n.125.
27 Parts 9-10 infra.
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effectively requires that buyers receive "reasonable information con-
cerning the plan of business and the financial condition of the
issuer.""
Facing these unhappy possibilities, we turn back to Tumblewood
to dig deeper for its meaning.
5. MEANING OF THE STATEMENT: THIS BROCHURE
OR ANY WRITTEN MATERIAL?
The court's statement on advertising"9 is ambiguous. The "such"
before "a brochure" may refer back to "a pamphlet or brochure used
to aid in the sale of securities" in the preceding sentence, or forward
to "as appellee used . . . to aid him in selling stock" in the same
sentence.
(A) The first contruction would prohibit any brochure in the
sale of a security under section 5.1. Since the word "brochure" is left
undefined and unlimited (except perhaps by the facts of the case),
serious doubt is cast on the use of any written matter in a small
offering exemption.
(B) The second construction would be a less restrictive prohibi-
tion, covering brochures like Matise's in method of use or perhaps in
contentY
The second interpretation seems more desirable and less rigid, but
we can't be confident that it is the right one.
6. STATUTORY EVOLUTION OF SMALL OFFERING EXEMPTIONS:
PROGRESSIVE RELAXATION
Any statute is a product of its evolution, particularly the Texas
Securities Act which has been changed by virtually every session of
the legislature since 1935. The small offering exemption, first intro-
duced in that year, has been repeatedly amended to enlarge the
types of issuers who may use it, the kinds of securities which may
be sold, and the number of persons who may buy.' At the same
time, the conditions restricting methods of offering have progres-
sively relaxed:
1935-55: "without the use of advertisements, circulars, agents,
salesmen, solicitors, or any form of public solicitation.""
1955-57: "without the use of advertisements, circulars, or any
form of public solicitation."'
3
2"Bromberg, op. cit. supra note 2, at 549-50.
"°See note 20 supra.
30 Part 9 infra.
a" The details are traced in Bromberg, op. cit. supra note 2, at 539, n.6.
"TEx. GEN. & SpEc. LAWS 1935, ch. 100, § 3(j).
3 TEx. GEN. & SPEc. LAWS 1955, ch. 67, § 3(j) and ch. 384, § 3(j).
[Vol. 20:239
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1957-63: "without the use of advertisements or any form of pub-
lic solicitation. ' ' 4
1963-date: "without any public solicitation or advertisements.""5
Thus, the prohibitory language has dropped agents, salesmen, soli-
citors and circulars, all of which are impliedly permitted-unless,
of course, their use amounts to public solicitation or advertisement.
When the legislature stopped its absolute ban on circulars in 1957,
it authorized a reasonable inference that circulars are not identical
with advertisements. Since brochures and circulars have so much in
common,"0 it seems likely that brochures are not absolutely banned
(i.e., as being equivalent to advertisements) either. At the very
least, the statutory history makes it imperative that all the circum-
stances be considered in deciding whether a particular piece is an ad-
vertisement. 7
When the legislature added the specific information provision" to
one of the small offering exemptions in 1963, it neither required nor
prohibited written information. For good reasons," it must have con-
templated that some of the information would be in writing. Yet it
retained the prohibition on advertisements in all the small offering
exemptions. This strongly confirms the view that written material
is not an advertisement per se.
7. ADVERTISEMENT PROHIBITION IN SMALL OFFERING EXEMPTIONS
There are two basic ways to write a small offering exemption: (A)
limit the number of offerees, numerically" or otherwise,4 or (B)
34 TEX. GEN. & SPEC. LAWS 1957, ch. 269, § 5.1.
asTEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581, § 5I (1964). See also notes 77 and 86 infra.
' For the dictionary definitions of "brochure," see note 59 infra. A circular is "an
announcement, advertisement or directive, typically in the form of a printed leaflet in-
tended to be sent to many persons or otherwise distributed widely," WEBSTER'S NEW IN-
TERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1961), or "a circular letter, note or paper, usually
printed, copies of which are addressed or given to various persons." Id. (2d ed. 1954).
s" See Part 9 infra.
"SNote 28 supra.
"9 See Part 4 supra.
4 E.g., UNIFORM SUcRrrIs ACT § 402 (b) (9) (10 offerees in the state); 22 jurisdic-
tions referred to in note 41 infra.
41 Securities Act of 1933, § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2), ("not involving any public
offering") construed, e.g., in SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552, Nov. 6, 1962, 1 CCH
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 5 2770-83, and S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
For a recent compilation of state exemptions, see Note, Regulation of Nonissuer
Transactions Under Federal and State Securities Laws, 78 HARV. L. REv. 1635, chart fol-
lowing 1648, col. headed "Private Offering" (1965). The chart shows 35 jurisdictions
with private or small offering exemptions, of which 22 measure by number of offerees.
The other 13 (Fla., Ill., Iowa, Mass., Miss., Mo., N.M., Pa., Tenn., Tex., Va., W. Va., Wis.)
use the number of buyers or security holders. Of the 13, apparently only Florida and Texas
have information requirements, and only these two plus Pennsylvania and Virginia prohibit
advertisements and public solicitation. FLA. STAT. § 517.06(11) (Supp. 1965); 70 PA.
STAT. ANN. § 32(f)(10) (1965); Tex. § 5.1; VA. CODE § 13.1-514(b)(8) (1964 as
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limit the number of buyers or security holders."2 For the former
group, advertising is impliedly prohibited since it constitutes an offer
and normally exceeds the limits. 3 For the latter group, whose exemp-
tions are more generous than an equal limit on offerees, express re-
striction on advertising or public solicitation is a logical corollary. It
serves as a sort of non-numerical limit on offerees and helps to keep
the offering from getting out of hand. It may reduce the temptation
to exceed the limits on buyers or holders by creating beneficial inter-
ests which do not appear of record, in hopes of escaping detection.
More basically, it helps shield the general public against unregistered
offerings and keeps the offerings more or less confined to people who
know each other or can take care of themselves." Without some
limit on offerees, a seller would be free to solicit the world for the
most helpless buyer, or the one who would pay the highest price."5
Only four states appear to be following this pattern of a numerical
limit on buyers or holders, and a non-numerical limit on offerees,"
although others may reach a similar result by different means."
8. ADVERTISING REGULATION
8.1 General
Quite apart from the advertisement prohibition in the small off-
ering exemptions, some states exercise more sweeping control over
advertising, typically in non-exempt transactions, by requiring either
its filing" or its approval." Texas takes the former approach."° The
amended by Laws 1966 S.B. No. 102, § 2); BLUE SKY L. REP. (Va.) 5 49.214.
Others dampen, if not eliminate, advertising or solicitation by barring the payment of
commissions and severly limiting distribution expense, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 189.07
(1) (a) (Supp. 1966) (greater of 3% of proceeds, $350); W. VA. CODE ANN.
3272(4) (h) (1961) (same except $250).
' Thirteen jurisdictions referred to in note 41 supra. Texas §§ 5.1(a) and 5.I(c) illus-
trate both variations, limiting security holders and buyers, respectively.
' On advertising as an offer, see note 52 infra. See also Robertson v. Business Boosters'
Country Club, 212 Ala. 621, 103 So. 576 (1925); People v. Clark, 215 Cal. App.2d 734,
30 Cal. Rptr. 487 (1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 943 (1963) (newspaper advertisement
for an "associate" destroyed claimed exemption, under CALIF. CORP. CODE § 25100(m), for
joint venture not offered to the public). See also note 45 infra.
" For a more comprehensive discussion of the rationale for the small offering exemptions,
see Bromberg, op. cit. supra note 2, at 558-67.
'Cf. 1 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 505-06 (2d ed. 1961), discussing a Wall Street
Journal ad for one or two partners in an oil drilling venture, administratively treated as
a public offering under federal law. See also note 43 supra.
"Florida, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Virginia, note 41 supra.
47 See note 41 supra, last par.
4SE.g., UNIFORM SECURITIEs ACT § 403; CALIF. CORP. CODE § 25602. Semble, under
the limited federal exemptions (Regulations A) for offerings under $300,000, SEC Rule 258,
17 C.F.R. 230, 258.
"'E.g., 122Y2 ILL. STAT. ANN. § 137.9 (1960); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80.18 (Supp.
1965); S. D. CODE § 55.1918 (Supp. 1960).
" Section 22.B (3). This has been interpreted to require filing five days before use, except
in the case of final prospectuses and "tombstone ads." State Securities Board, Interpretation
of the Quoted Portion of Subsection (3) of § 22.B, Texas Securities Act (Oct. 29, 1962).
[Vol. 20:239
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primary purpose is to let the administrator police the advertising,
e.g., by prohibiting its use if fraudulent or misleading."' A second
purpose is deterrent, to discourage advertisers from preparing mis-
leading material.
This kind of advertising control is part of the larger thrust of the
securities laws to prevent offers of unregistered securities and mis-
leading offers of all securities. Advertising is embraced by the cus-
tomary broad definition of "offer""2 and is therefore typically illegal
unless the security is registered, or the security or transaction is
exempt.
In Texas, at least, history demonstrates that the trend in adver-
tising regulation (as in small offering exemptions) has been relaxa-
tion. The last major revision (1955)" reversed an administrative
practice which prohibited the circulation of "red herring" (prelim-
inary) prospectuses filed with the SEC in registrations which had not
yet become effective at federal or state levels." It carried forward
in other respects the old rule preventing advertising of unregistered
securities, and necessarily preserved the broad concept and implied
definition of advertising for this purpose which dates from 1935 s
and is almost the same today:"6 "any circular, advertisement, pamph-
let, prospectus, program or other matter . ..concerning any secur-
ity." Even this need not include all written material, since the verbs
operating on the quoted objects are "issue, distribute, or publish, ' s
which denote some fairly broad dissemination.
8.2 Application To Tumblewood
This general provision on advertising regulation was the basis of
the Tumblewood court's statement on advertising in the small offer-
"
5 E.g., CALIF. CORP. CODE § 25603; S. D. CODE § 55. 1918 (Supp. 1960); Tex. 23.B
(false, misleading, otherwise likely to deceive). Semble, under Regulation A, SEC Rule
261 (a) (2), 17 C.F.R. 230.261 (a) (2).
s An offer includes "every . . . attempt to dispose of a security for value" and spe-
cifically refers to "an attempt to sell, or an offer to sell ... by a circular, letter, or adver-
tisement or otherwise," including those deposited in the mails, Section 4.E. Virtually every
securities law has a broad definition of offer in terms of an attempt to dispose for value,
e.g., UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 401 (i)(2); Securities Act of 1933, § 2(3), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77(b) (3); see Loss & COWETT, BLUE SKY LAW 345 (1958). Consistently with these
broad definitions, very subtle conditioning activities may constitute offers in securities law
although they would not in contract law. See I Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 215-21, 512-
13 (2d ed. 1961).
"TEx. GEN. & SPEC. LAWS 1955, ch. 27, § 23, substantially the same as present § 22.
"Tinsley, Texas Securities Act, 18 TEXAS BAR J. 273, 358-59 (1955).
s TEX. GEN. & SPEC. LAWS 1935, ch. 100, 5 24. The filing requirements and stop-order
powers originated here too, TEx. GEN. & SPEC. LAWS 1935, ch. 100, § 23, 24.
" Section 22.A, which differs only in substituting "as to" for "concerning."
I bid., which reads: "It shall be unlawful . . . for any person to issue, distribute, or
publish, within this State, any circular, advertisement, pamphlet, prospectus, program or
other matter, as to any security, unless such advertising complies with . . . this Section
..." "Distribute" was not in the 1935 version but was added in 1955.
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ing context-indeed it seems tacitly to equate the two notions of
advertising-as well as of the Attorney General's brief on the issue.
It is a logical starting point, but it doesn't take us very far. " For one
thing, it is not an explicit definition, even within its own section. For
another, it talks of "advertising" rather than "advertisements" (the
latter used in section 5.1). It probably requires broad dissemination
before it is invoked.59 Its history indicates that its purpose was to pre-
vent offers in general, not to restrict particular offers expressly permit-
ted. This brings us to the last and most important reason why the
general advertising regulation is irrelevant: it has, by its own terms,
never applied to exempt transactions and securities."0 All these fac-
tors were regrettably overlooked, or ignored, by the Attorney Gen-
eral and perhaps by the court."' There is an intimation that the
court grasped them when it toned down the Attorney General's
unqualified language by adding the "such" verbiage whose am-
biguity we have noted.' There is a hope that the Texas Supreme
Court grasped them when it refused the writ, ren.r.e.," although it
gave us no guidance.0 3
9. ELEMENTS OF AN ADVERTISEMENT
"Advertisement" and "advertising" are words of many nuances.
They don't mean necessarily the same thing on Madison Avenue and
on Main Street. I think they mean different things in sections 5.1 and
22. Although dictionary and treatise definitions abound, it is toler-
ably clear that the words take coloration from their surroundings
and need interpretation in context. The following effort at analysis
is aimed at the section 5.1 problem.
9.1 Format And Quantity
This discussion is concerned primarily with written material, since
it is hard to regard spoken words as an advertisement unless they
5SBromberg, op. cit. supra note 2, at 552 n.63.
" Note 57 supra.
"0Section 22.E; TEX. GEN. & SPEC. LAWS 1955, ch. 67, § 23(e); TEx. GEN. & SPEC.
LAWS 1935, ch. 67, § 23. Further confirmation is found in the fact that the cited provisions
bring the regulatory portions back into play (i.e., eliminate the exemptions) as to a particu-
lar piece of advertising if the administrator finds that it is false, misleading or likely to de-
ceive. TEX. GEN. & SaEc. LAWS 1935, ch. 67, § 24, 2d sentence, S 23.B. The combined
effect is to free exempt securities and transactions from the entire apparatus of § 22 (in-
cluding its definition), unless there is falsity or deception.
0" The § 22 exemption provision was called to the court's attention in Tumblewood
in Appellee's (Matise's) Reply to the Amicus Curiae Brief of the State of Texas, pp. 5-7,
17-18.
62 Part 5 supra. See also note 74 infra.
"3The court might have dispelled the confusion in a few words, as it did in its per
curiam n.r.e, opinion, Grogan v. Grogan, 159 Tex. 392, 322 S.W.2d 514 (1959), tersely
rejecting the improper grounds for holding the voting trust there invalid.
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are broadcast. A written advertisement is not readily definable by
physical form, although most would agree that a salesman's personal
notes of what he is going to say are not advertising, and that a bill-
board, or newspaper spread is. In between lie individual letters,
mimeographed circulars, printed booklets and many other varieties.
Perhaps a useful line can be drawn between sales aids (used by the
seller himself in dealing with prospects) and advertisements (used
to locate or pre-condition prospects). This line is not rigid; since a
sales aid can become an advertisement if used on a large enough scale.
Logically, and I think, legally, the method of production is irrele-
vant, although the slicker and more "professional" the art work,
layout, packaging, and processing, the more it seems like an adver-
tisement. Similarly, the more copies that are made, the more it sug-
gests an ad.
Matise's piece, which the court consistently calls a brochure,"
was made by him on the equipment of his blueprint shop. Thus it
was not press-printed, although it apparently reproduced some things
which were. We are not told how it was put together, although
there is reference to one copy in an elaborate arrangement, with
acetate dividers and an elaborate back." There may have been only
two or three copies in all.
9.2 Content And Tone
Again, it is hard to draw sharp lines. But it appears that (at least
from the legal viewpoint) the more factual, comprehensive, bal-
anced, and low-keyed the presentation, the less it resembles adver-
tising. Without disparaging the advertising business, we must rec-
ognize that it tends to deal in the promotional, the selective, the
emphatic. An SEC prospectus would not be advertising in this sense.
But it would be with the addition of "Special this week while they
last!", "Make a Million in Tumblewood!", "Here's the bargain
you've been waiting for!" or "Want to Double Your Money?"' "
A related factor is who prepared the material. The use of a profes-
sional advertising or public relations man points toward advertising,
though it is hardly decisive. Nor is it conclusive the other way that
an amateur did the work.
" A brochure is "a printed or stitched book containing only a few leaves," WEBSTER'S
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1954), a "pamphlet, booklet," id. (3d ed. 1961).
In the trial, Matise and others referred variously to brochures, booklets, brochure booklets.
Testimony, op. cit. supra note 15, at 86-88, 104-05.
"s Testimony, op. cit. supra note 15, at 104-05.
"Moreover, when publicly distributed, even the most sober SEC prospectus is probably
an advertisement. It is for § 22 purposes, e.g., § 22.D. Even a bare-bones "tombstone" an-
nouncement, identifying the security and the place where a prospectus may be obtained, is
probably an advertisement if it appears in a newspaper.
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We have insufficient facts to rate Matise's brochure on these scores.
9.3 Dissemination And Medium
The most important ingredient, and the only one on which there is
any legal authority, is the way the material is used. No one could
seriously argue that a piece of paper is an advertisement before any-
body sees it, and it is reasonable to say that a fair number of persons
have to see it before it achieves that status. How many must see it is
a troubling question. Despite the variety of contexts in which it
arises, cases outside the securities area have said with surprising uni-
formity that advertising involves the public."7 What little Texas
authority exists is in accord, s as are the one or two securities deci-
sions from other states. 9 All this dovetails neatly with the idea that
the Texas small offering exemptions are for private rather than
public use.
Critical readers will wonder how I distinguish "advertisements"
from "public solicitation," which are side by side in the prohibition.
In all honesty, I think they are partially redundant, with the latter
67 See, e.g., Sassone v. Board, 201 Cal. App.2d 165, 20 Cal. Rptr. 231 (Dist. Ct. App.
1962) (improper advertising by chiropractor): advertising is to give public notice, to an-
nounce publicly, to call public attention to something; State v. Cusick, 248 Iowa 1168, 84
N.W.2d 554 (1957) (false advertising): advertising is seeking to develop in the public an
interest in something. Authorities are collected in 2A WORDS & PHRASES 280-83 (1955);
id. at 14-15 (Supp. 1965).
" Edwards v. Lubbock County, 33 S.W.2d 482, 484 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) (advertis-
ing requirement for sale of land by county commissioners) : advertising is "a means or method
of attracting public attention." The Tumblewood trial court followed this when it instructed
the jury in connection with Special Issue No. 4 on advertisements: "By the term 'adver-
tisement' is meant printed material, pictures, drawings, or other means or method of at-
tracting public attention, issued, distributed or published to aid and assist in selling stock.
The term 'advertising' is synonymous with 'notice.' " The three verbs in the first sentence
are from the advertising regulation provision, § 22, discussed at text accompanying note 57
supra and correctly carry the public connotation. The second sentence of the instruction, also
taken from the Edwards case, seems irrelevant and incorrect unless it means public notice.
The jury answered: "The sale of stock was accomplished without the use of advertise-
ments."
See also State v. Guardian Foundation of Texas, Inc., 128 S.W.2d 880, 882 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1939) error dism. judg. cor. (quo warranto for corporation organized to do a general
advertising business): "Advertising . . . means more than merely announcing, making
known, or turning the attention of the public toward a certain product. Its ultimate pur-
pose is to sell or to help sell," [quoting STARCH, PRINCIPLES OF ADVERTISING (1925)].
Sale to the public seems implied.
"9People v. Montague, 280 Mich. 610, 274 N.W. 347, 351 (1937) (exemption for pre-
incorporation subscriptions if not "solicited by advertising"): advertising means "making
public intimation or announcement of anything" (quoting from 2 C.J.S. 891); other
definitions are mentioned.
Conversely, where there is an exemption (or exclusion) of non-public offerings (e.g.,
see note 41 supra), the courts have cited the absence of advertising as a factor sustaining
the exemption. Gillespie v. Long, 212 Ala. 34, 101 So. 651 (1924); Robertson v. Business
Boosters' Country Club, 210 Ala. 460, 98 So. 272 (1923); People v. Ruthven, 160 Misc.
112, 288 N.Y.S. 631 (Rochester City Ct. 1936). Gillespie v. Long, supra, held that a private
transaction was not within the statute prohibiting sales and offers "by means of any adver-
tisements, circulars or prospectus, or by any other form of public offering." The court
recognized that advertising was necessarily public in this context.
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completely overlapping the former. But this is "bad" statutory con-
struction, since it fails to give effect to all words."0 The technical
distinction, then, perhaps is that solicitation involves a more personal
element; while advertisement is an impersonal document or broad-
cast. For example, a man peddling stock on a busy street corner
might not be advertising if he only talked; he would be if he handed
out leaflets or wore a sandwich board. But he would be soliciting in
any case.
All this reduces to the familiar proposition that advertising is a
use of media such as newspapers, handbills, radio, or television.
Direct mail is another advertising medium72 but involves more than
a few recipients. Robot typewriters and copying machines have
eliminated any legal difference between what appears to be a per-
sonal letter and what is identifiably mass-produced. This is not to
say that a few letters or memoranda would constitute advertising;
normally they would not. But in a mailing of a thousand, the tech-
nique of production is unimportant.
9.4 Relative Weight Of Elements
In identifying an advertisement, I think public distribution is the
dominant criterion and perhaps the only one. Yet it is certainly rea-
sonable to recognize an interdependence of elements. It may be that
a hand-written communication to one person could be so strident
and alluring, such a come-on, that it would be classed as adver-
tisement and defeat the exemption. I doubt it, particularly since the
securities law has other ways of dealing with this kind of thing, 3
but I do not deny the possibility. Tone and content seem more im-
portant factors than format and quantity (except so far as the
latter is a link to public distribution). The relevant number is those
who see the material, not those who keep it. A single billboard or
TV broadcast is as much an advertisement as a quantity of circulars
placed in cars in a shopping center. And a single brochure shown
briefly to a hundred people but retained by the exhibitor, seems to
71 If you think the legislature can't be redundant, look at the preamble of § 5.
71 It makes a kind of formal sense to say that advertisement is distinct from solicitation
in that the former is prohibited even in private use, and the latter only in public. But I
cannot accept this argument in view of the much stronger ones for public dissemination as
an essential ingredient of an advertisement.
71 If legal confirmation is needed, it can be found in S 4.E, discussed supra note 52. See
also Birchfield v. State, 401 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966) (letters were public
solicitation).
7 The Commissioner may prevent its use if he finds it false, misleading or likely to de-
ceive, § 23.B. The catch, of course, is that he's not likely to know about it. But the buyer
is given a potent remedy-recovery of his purchase price from the seller-if it is misleading,
S 33.A(2). Somewhat comparable remedies are available under federal laws, depending
largely on whether the mails or interstate commerce have been used.
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be no more or less an advertisement than a hundred mailed to or left
with the same persons, one each.
10. FINAL CRITIQUE OF Tumblewood
Now we can make a fuller appraisal of Tumblewood. Its main
holding (on public solicitation) is not disputed. Its alternate holding
(on advertisements) is ambiguous at best and catastrophic at worst.
If it means that Matise's brochure was an advertisement because it
was shown to several hundred people and perhaps because of its pro-
motional character (e.g., earnings projections) or material omis-
sions, our only complaint would be that the court didn't spell out
the reasons. This is the better, more logical interpretation, '4 but
who can be sure that it is what the court had in mind?
If the statement means that any written material shown to a pros-
pective buyer is an advertisement which destroys the small offering
exemption, it is disastrously wrong for many reasons:
1. It is inconsistent with the disclosure purposes of the Texas and
U. S. acts. '
2. It takes its concept of advertising from a quite distinct statu-
tory context, which is expressly inapplicable."4
3. It ignores the essential ingredient in advertising: its public
distribution."
4. It disregards the history and purpose of § 5.1, particularly its
successive relaxations."6
' Some support for it is given by Birchfield v. State, 401 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1966), finding that letters to companies taken from the phone book, personal solicita-
tion and offers to numerous acquaintances of a third party, all followed up by brochures,
constituted public solicitation. The court doesn't say whether it regards the brochures as
advertisements.
" Texas did not start out with a disclosure act and still has a selective or qualitative
one in terms of its principal administrative standard: securities may not be registered or sold
unless "fair, just and equitable" in the Commissioner's judgment, §§ 10, 7.C(2), 23.A.
The first main step toward conversion to a disclosure standard was the 1957 addition of
a requirement that registered offerings be made "by prospectus which fairly discloses the
material facts about the plan of finance and business." Section 9.C discussed in Meer, op. cit.
supra note 21, at 450, and note 19 supra. Technically, this applies to registrations by quali-
fication, only one of the three methods prescribed by § 7. But registrations by coordina-
tion require a prospectus by force of federal law. Securities Act of 1933, § 5(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77(e)(b). And the Commissioner effectively requires registrants by notification to use a
prospectus, by proposing to call a § 23 hearing on the fair-just-equitable question if a
prospectus is not voluntarily used.
The second main step was the 1963 amendment to § 33.A(2), quoted at note 24 supra,
which created civil liability for material omissions. This applies to exempt as well as reg-
istered offerings. It was paralleled by another 1963 amendment, discussed at notes 28 and
38 supra, creating an affirmative information requirement under the small offering exemption
by fifteen buyers a year.
" Part 8.1 and 8.2 supra.
77Parts 9, 9.3 supra. Since 1963, after the Tumblewood sales, § 5.1 has been amended
so that "public" precedes "advertisements" as well as "solicitation," strengthening the argu-
ment that "public" is an element in "advertisements."
78 Part 7 supra.
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5. It threatens small business with unwitting civil (and conceiv-
ably even criminal) liability in perfectly honest securities sales
which turn out not to be exempt because information given the buyer
is treated as an "advertisement." The seriousness is magnified because
these are the most commonly used exemptions."
If by chance Tumblewood (construed to prohibit any written ma-
terial in a small offering exemption) was right on the law in 1960,
it is wrong on the law since 1963.1
And if Tumblewood means that some written material is advertis-
ing, but other is not, it has left us woefully without guidance in
conducting everyday business under the Securities Act.
Whatever damage has been done by the ambiguous statement on
advertising in Tumblewood has been compounded by its unambig-
uous, unqualified injection into the bloodstream of legal literature,
through the West headnote: "Pamphlet or brochure used to aid in
sale of securities would be 'advertising' within provision of securities
act exempting sales of securities when total number of stockholders
will not exceed 35 and sale is made without use of advertising.""2
So it will emerge into Words and Phrases, the Digests and encyclo-
pedias, and thence very likely into the writings of other lawyers and
the holdings of other judges.
The Tumblewood problem emerges a classic of inadvertence and
waste: the minor issue in a hard-fought case, the sweeping generaliza-
tion of a state official more concerned with other things, the loose
language of one court, the failure to perceive and correct the trouble
in another, the literal-mindedness of a digester, and now the long-
winded apprehensions of a law professor.
11. NEED FOR CLARIFICATION
Far from an academic problem, the meaning of advertisement is
critical to thousands of corporations, many thousands of investors,
and millions of dollars of transactions in Texas every year. 3 Unless
sooner clarified by binding precedent, the next legislature should be
asked to do the job. It might proceed in various ways, stated in des-
cending order of efficiency, as I see them.
1. Delete "advertisements" from the section, so that the only re-
maining prohibition would be on public solicitation. This would en-
lirge the intended scope of the provision not at all, or only mini-
" Sections 29.A, 29.B.
:0 See Bromberg, op. cit. supra note 2, at 560-61 nn.1 17-18.
1 See notes 24, 75 and 77 supra and text at notes 28 and 38.
52 388 S.W.2d 479, headnote 6.
'
5 See estimating data in Bromberg, op. cit. supra note 2, at 560-61, esp. n.118.
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mally.'" The change would be a natural one historically." Moreover,
it would recognize that the small offering exemption is not depend-
ent on the general advertising control of section 22 and avoid any
compromise of the broader definition appropriate to the latter.
2. Clarify that "advertisement" in section 5.1 has a public aspect,
either by inserting "public" before it," or by substituting "without
any public solicitation (by advertisements or otherwise)." The former,
though awkward in phraseology, is clearer in meaning, since the
latter leaves something to implication. '
3. Define advertising, either positively (by saying what it is) or
negatively (by saying what it is not). Both present difficulties, one
of rigidity, the other of incompleteness. A middle ground, perhaps
no better, would be a specification that an advertisement is deter-
mined by its use, not by its physical form or content.
12. WHAT To Do UNTIL THEN
Meanwhile, back in the office, we have to live with Tumblewood.
This article is full of reasons why the court's ambiguous statement
on advertising should mean only a rather promotional brochure
(with earnings predictions and without other relevant information)
shown to a group large enough to be called public. It is also full of
reasons why the statement, if it means more, should be limited to its
facts. While waiting for the doubts to be put at rest by the legisla-
ture or a more precise and authoritative decision, we must continue
to use the small offering exemptions, since registration would be en-
tirely impractical in most instances and since business cannot stop
financing. How we use them will depend on our appraisal of the
risk of Tumblewood and, of course, on how much control we can
exert over our clients.
Written disclosure to buyers in small offering exemptions is still
vital, in my estimation, to comply with the spirit of the Texas and
(if applicable) federal securities laws, and to escape civil liability
under them. This, in my judgment, takes precedence over any con-
trary implications of Tumblewood. To minimize the dangers created
by Tumblewood, my suggestions are:
1. Stick to the facts, as complete and unadorned as possible. Dis-
close the negative as well as the positive aspects of the offering. Earn-
84See Part 9.3, 2d par., supra.
8 See Part 6 suipra.
8This would strengthen the inference given by the 1963 amendment, which put
"public solicitation" before "advertisements" and arguably made "public" modify "adver-
tisements" too; see note 77 supra.
8" An appealing variant is the 1966 Virginia amendment, op. cit. supra note 41: "if .
not . . . offered to the general public by advertisement or solicitation."
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ings projections should be avoided or, if absolutely essential, conserv-
atively presented with a clear explanation of the underlying assump-
tions and inevitable uncertainties.
2. Avoid art work, fancy layouts, professional advertising men,
printing and binding. Stay with typed material, preferably stapled
as a letter or memorandum.
3. Minimize the number of copies and, above all, do not expose
them (or any oral offer) to more than a small number of carefully
selected prospects. Keep track of all copies, in case a question arises
later.
Even with these precautions, a lawyer will hope that he isn't asked
for an unqualified opinion that a transaction is exempt. Of course,
all this may not be feasible for some situations. More sadly, most
businessmen and many lawyers will not even know there's a need
for caution.
